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 POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE MEDIA 
ROBERT G. MEADOW* 
The motives behind violence are usually to force compliance, to 
subjugate, to persuade, or to intimidate, except for those most deviant 
individuals or groups who enjoy pointless bloodshed.  There are many types 
of violence that are common within societies—domestic violence, criminal 
violence, and routine interpersonal violence.
1
  Much of this violence takes 
place in private, with very limited or no mass media coverage of the violent 
acts themselves because their occurrence is unpredictable, invisible, random, 
or not subject to audiences.  Moreover, individual acts of violence often go 
unmeasured, except in the case of death.  These acts rarely have significant 
social consequences even though, cumulatively, they may have major 
consequences (such as indicating a crime wave or promoting laws to fight 
domestic abuse).
2
  Private acts of violence are occasionally recorded by means 
of cell phone, home video, security cameras, and nanny-cams.  If sensational 
enough, they are rebroadcast in mass media; however, they are not a standard 
part of media news coverage. 
Violence commonly covered by mainstream news media includes socially 
sanctioned violence (organized prizefighting, police actions) or violence 
between and among societies (international terrorism, wars).  Less universal, 
with wide variation across political cultures, is coverage of political violence.  
Political violence—sometimes officially sanctioned by governments seeking 
to remain in power and other times by competitors seeking to control 
government—is used to capture or maintain political power. 
Political violence can take many forms, including assassinations, 
rebellions, guerilla wars, kidnappings, or mob violence.  Violent outbreaks 
between legislators are also common in some political systems.
3
 
 
* Robert G. Meadow, Ph.D. is a partner at Lake Research Partners, a political consulting firm 
in Washington, D.C.  This Essay is based on a brief talk given at the Marquette International Media 
and Conflict Resolution Conference on March 21, 2009. 
1. Examples of domestic violence include spousal abuse and corporal punishment for children.  
Criminal violence can include murders, rapes, and muggings.  Routine interpersonal violence can 
include disputes that result in physical altercations. 
2. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH (Etienne 
G. Krug et al. eds., 2002). 
3. See, e.g., YouTube.com, 2008 Greatest Parliamentary Fights of All Time, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZ-hNVfTZqw (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); YouTube.com, Raw 
Video: Lawmakers Brawl in Mexico, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7poK4TlGeWo  
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009); YouTube.com, Alabama Senate Fight, 
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Political violence such as rebellions and insurrections may take place over 
years, but it can also occur in a time-concentrated form in the context of 
elections.  Death tallies from political violence such as civil wars often have 
thresholds for reporting and analysis—but election violence, which typically 
has far fewer victims, is rarely studied.  Only the exceptions, such as Kenya’s 
2007 election and 2008 post-election violence—with nearly 3,500 casualties, 
including more than 1,000 killed and 350,000 displaced—are widely 
reported.
4
  This Essay looks at a subset of political violence—election 
violence—and its presentation in the media. 
A full understanding of election violence and the media needs to be rooted 
in a richer understanding of two elements.  The first is an understanding of the 
media—which media we are discussing, what topics are covered, what 
resources are dedicated to a story, and what makes something ―newsworthy.‖  
These topics are far too extensive to be reviewed in this brief Essay.  Suffice it 
to say that the old adage ―if it bleeds, it leads‖ underscores the premium news 
media—and especially electronic media—place on vivid violence.  Indeed, 
having some understanding of the nature of news coverage may well be part 
of the calculus groups use when engaged in election violence to intimidate 
voters.  Media presentations of election violence surely reach more voters 
than just those who witness the violence in person. 
The second element requiring understanding is the role of violence in 
conflict societies.
5
  These societies are characterized by a lack of consensus on 
governance, questionable legitimacy of governing institutions, or unresolved 
and ongoing religious, racial, or ethnic cleavages.
6
  Commonly, such conflict 
is manifested through civil war, guerrilla conflicts, domestic terrorism, or 
domestic military campaigns.
7
  Often times, elections in conflict societies 
cannot take place because the government is a dictatorship
8
 or civil unrest 
 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlXKBribICs (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  This is true 
particularly in Asia, where in Taiwanese Mandarin there is a special word to describe violence on the 
floor of the legislature.  The rough translation for legislative floor violence in Taiwan is ―legislative 
brawling.‖  See Alice Wu, Laugh Off All Those Political Banana Skins, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST, Jan. 17, 2009, at 10. 
4. See, e.g., COMM’N OF INQUIRY ON POST ELECTION VIOLENCE, WAKI REPORT 331, 351, 
http://www.eastandard.net/downloads/Waki_Report.pdf [hereinafter WAKI COMMISSION]. 
5. For further analysis of the strategies for domestic conflict, see STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE 
LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 23 (Margaret Levi et al. eds., 2006). 
6. See Raffaele Marchetti & Nathalie Tocci, Conflict Society: Understanding the Role of Civil 
Society in Conflict, 21 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 201, 205 (2009). 
7. See generally CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 64 (Doug 
McAdam et al. eds., 2003).  For a comprehensive list of data sets on political violence, see American 
Political Science Association Task Force on Political Violence and Terrorism, 
http://www.apsanet.org/content_29436.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
8. Knowledgerush.com, Dictatorship, http://knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Dictatorship/ 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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makes the administration of elections dangerous or impossible.
9
 
In democratic societies, and indeed even in nondemocratic societies that 
hold noncompetitive elections with predetermined outcomes, elections are 
characterized by an intense period of campaigning.  In addition, media 
attention to politics is usually heightened during the election campaign period.  
Elections are supposed to be ―free.‖10  While the election period varies from 
years (e.g., in the United States) to a thirty- or sixty-day window in other 
societies,
11
 our focus is on political violence that takes place around elections, 
and on those whose goal it is for one or more political actors to gain electoral 
advantage.
12
 
To be sure, election violence is only one of many options on the ―menu of 
manipulation‖ available to political candidates and parties and used to 
persuade the electorate and manipulate outcomes.  On the one hand, there is 
manipulation regarding the election process.
13
  Tactics include registration 
fraud, vote buying, ballot box stuffing, and counting fraud.
14
 
On the other hand, there is manipulation regarding the electorate.
15
  The 
electorate is manipulated through nonviolent activities, including debates, 
television and mail advertising, posters, signs, text messaging, or the Internet, 
and usually but not always benign activities such as rallies or door-to-door 
canvassing and persuasion efforts.
16
  These latter activities are not always 
benign because rallies can turn violent or confrontational and canvassing can 
be designed to intimidate rather than inform; however, the activities in and of 
themselves are not necessarily violent.  Further along on the menu of 
 
9. See, e.g., Robert F. Worth et al., Security Clash with Thousands of Protesters in Tehran, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A1. 
10. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 75, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).  The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
declared the right to elections.  See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights states that citizens have the right and opportunity ―[t]o vote and to be elected at 
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.‖  Id. 
11. African Observers Comment on U.S. Presidential Campaign, AFRICAN TIMES (L.A.), Sept. 
15–30, 2008, at 5. 
12. For a more general approach to elections and violence, see David C. Rapoport & Leonard 
Weinberg, Elections and Violence, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 15, 
16–18 (David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2001); B. de Gaay Fortman, Elections and 
Civil Strife: Some Implications for International Election Observation, in ELECTION OBSERVATION 
AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 76, 77–79 (Jon Abbink & Gerti Hesseling eds., 2000). 
13. See Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 36, 44. 
14. Id.; see also Fabrice Lehoucq, Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types and Consequences, 6 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 233, 234 (2003).  
15. Lehoucq, supra note 14, at 235, 251. 
16. See Schedler, supra note 13, at 44. 
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manipulation are coercive, but nonviolent acts.
17
  Nonviolent acts include 
economic coercion, boycotts, shame, and psychological manipulation.
18
  Yet, 
other methods imply threats of physical harm such as vandalism, visibility, 
and intimidation. 
I.  DEFINING ELECTION VIOLENCE 
While there may be many contending definitions of election violence, for 
our purposes, election violence is defined as acts that are used to harm, 
intimidate, exploit, disrupt, determine, hasten, delay, or reverse electoral 
processes or outcomes, and acts that occur between the registration of a voter 
and the inauguration of a political regime.
19
 
There are several perspectives that can be taken on election violence, 
offering a wide range for analysis.  One can look at: (1) the tactics of violence 
(e.g., beatings, kidnappings, killings); (2) the perpetrators of violence (e.g., 
party officials, governments); (3) the participants in violence (e.g., paid thugs, 
mobs, police, military, campaign workers, party loyalists); (4) the venues of 
violence (e.g., polling places, street rallies, government offices); (5) the timing 
of violence (e.g., before, during, or after the voting period); and, of course, (6) 
the victims of violence (e.g., election officials, voters, candidates).
20
 
In developing a typology of election violence, the broadest question to be 
considered is whether election violence is proactive or reactive.
21
  Proactive 
violence involves violence or the threat of violence to affect election 
outcomes and voting decisions.
22
  Included in proactive violence are: 
 
(1)  Turnout suppression—The goal here is to suppress votes.  
Individual voters’ intentions may be difficult to discern; 
however, when there are cleavages along geographic, ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious boundaries, or a clear demographic 
basis of support, turnout suppression is an effective tactic 
because targets for violence or intimidation can be easily 
 
17. Megan Rief, Making Democracy Safe: Institutional Causes and Consequences of Electoral 
Coercion and Violence 5 (forthcoming Aug. 15, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan) (on file with author).   
18. Id. 
19. See JEFF FISCHER, ELECTORAL CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE: A STRATEGY FOR STUDY AND 
PREVENTION 3, 8 (2002), http://www.ifes.org/publication/aa0b586a072d706b699c9cdeb346946f/ 
EConflictPaper.pdf. 
20. Fischer offers a different categorization, including targets focused on electoral stakeholders 
(voters, candidates, election workers, media, and monitors), electoral information (registration data, 
results, ballots, and campaign materials), electoral facilities (polling and counting stations), and 
electoral events (rallies, travel to polling stations).  FISCHER, supra note 19, at 8–10. 
21. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 2, at 5–6. 
22. See Rief, supra note 17, at 28. 
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identified. 
 
(2)  Boycott enforcement—The goal here is to lower turnout 
and thereby delegitimize the election.  Enforcement targets 
can be one’s own ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic, or 
geographic group.
23
 
 
Reactive violence occurs post-election and is often used to protest 
unfavorable election outcomes.
24
  Reactive violence can take several forms: 
 
(1)  Justice seeking—to protest or redress outcomes from 
rigged or fraudulent elections. 
 
(2)  Retaliatory—to fulfill pre-election threats when the 
outcome is unsatisfactory. 
 
(3)  Outcome grieving—to show displeasure with the 
outcome of a legitimate election in which there is no clear 
evidence of rigging or fraud.  Often this violence is cloaked 
as redressing fraudulent elections.
25
 
 
The political culture of the system is likely to be a key variable in 
determining whether there will be election violence.  In most political 
systems, strong electioneering laws are designed to create a ―safe space‖ to 
limit the possibility of physical intimidation in proximity to the polls.
26
  
However, enforcement of such laws varies significantly.
27
 
In the United States, where there is a strong cultural norm of free 
elections, there have been episodes of political violence most closely 
associated with turnout suppression (e.g., threats of violence against African-
 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id.  The difficulty in distinguishing between justice seeking and outcome grieving can 
be seen in the 2009 protests following the Iranian presidential elections, which incumbent Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad claimed he won with 63% of the vote.  Nazila Fathi, A Recount Offer Fails to Silence 
Protests in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A1.  In the protests that followed, which showed 
substantial popular support for Mir-Hossein Moussavi, there was still no evidence of a Moussavi 
victory.  See also Iran’s Election Authority: Partial Recount Shows Election Valid, CNN.com (June 
30, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/29/iran.election/index.html.  According to 
the Guardian Council, subsequent recounts showed no substantial irregularities.  Id.  While the 
protesters claimed election fraud, no empirical evidence emerged that indicated the results were 
fraudulent or that Ahmadinejad lost the election.  Id. 
26. See FISCHER, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
27. See id. at 5. 
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Americans by organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan).
28
  Other nonviolent 
methods of protesting elections or suppression are more common.  These 
include Jim Crow laws to prevent registration of African-American voters, 
legislation to require specific forms of identification prior to voting, or long 
lines and insufficient staff to handle election-day volume.
29
 
Allegations of fraud (dead voters casting votes, ballots lost or destroyed) 
are common in closely contested elections, such as the 2000 United States 
Presidential election or the 2008 United States Senate contest in Minnesota.
30
  
But even in these extreme cases in which the mechanics of the election were 
contested (poorly constructed ballots, faulty voting machines,
31
 uneven and 
non-uniform application of election rules), the ultimate outcomes were 
accepted,
32
 albeit grudgingly, and violence was absent. Incidents of  
post-election violence in the United States are rare or, at the very least, not 
well documented.  Such is not the case in other systems. 
II.  THE MEDIA AND ELECTION VIOLENCE 
The structure of media organizations and the nature of elections make it 
very difficult to fully ascertain the role of media in election violence, 
particularly if the violence is in the form of subtle intimidation or threats.  
These threats can be made through personal contact, rendering them invisible 
to the media.  In addition, unlike other events such as mass political rallies or 
demonstrations, elections take place at thousands of venues in a given 
country.  Yet, major media outlets are typically found only in national capitals 
or large cities. 
Essentially, media outlets seem to have three frames for presentation of 
elections: violence or the images of voters going to the polls, ballots being 
dropped into ballot boxes, and officials and clerks counting returns. 
While an election may be largely violence-free in rural and less accessible 
areas, violence in urban areas comes to define the election—both for the 
world at large and for the voters who see their compatriots threatened or 
beaten.  While new technologies, such as cell phones and other highly mobile 
personal video devices, enable some bypassing of the mainstream media, 
 
28. See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights 
Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 493 (2006) (citing Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/ 
Gendered Violence, Outraging the Body Politic in Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 
692 (2002)).   
29. L. Darnell Weeden, How to Establish Flying the Confederate Flag with the State as 
Sponsor Violates the Equal Protection Clause, 34 AKRON L. REV. 521, 542 (2001). 
30. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000); In re Contest of Gen. Election, 767 
N.W.2d 453, 456 (2009). 
31. Bush, 351 U.S. at 104. 
32. Id. at 122; In re Contest, 767 N.W.2d at 456. 
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there is often skepticism of the breadth of violence and issues of 
authenticity.
33
 
The media play two crucial roles with respect to election violence.  First, 
they provide evidence—or at least the external implication—that an election 
is illegitimate or being contested domestically, regardless of the fairness of the 
election or its certification by independent election commissions and election 
monitoring organizations.  Interpretative frames may imply that the election 
has not been ―free and fair‖ and has been rigged through voter intimidation or 
vote-counting fraud.  Second, by showing compatriots being hurt or killed, the 
media serve to inform the domestic audience of the risks and dangers of 
participating in or protesting the election.  While graphic images of violence 
may incite further protests, such protests more often dissipate in response to 
the risks, especially when the media also cover suppression of protests (like 
those in Tiananmen Square or more recently in Iran) and officials use the 
media to threaten violence against protesters.
34
 
III.  NOTABLE RECENT EXAMPLES OF ELECTION VIOLENCE 
There is no shortage of examples of election violence captured in the mass 
media.  The most recent example comes from Iran.  Demonstrators took to the 
streets, at times violently protesting, while police and militia enforcers 
suppressed the demonstrations with lethal force.  Images of the 
demonstrations that took place in Tehran, including the cell phone image of a 
demonstrator shot to death, were widely broadcast.
35
 
Recent elections in Sri Lanka were often characterized by election 
violence, although not necessarily a result of interethnic conflict.
36
  The 
Sinhalese government has now declared a ―final victory‖ against the 
rebellious Tamil Tigers who are more or less ―peacefully‖ demonstrating in 
their diaspora locations (e.g., New York and London).
37
  Only time will tell if 
 
33. See, e.g., YouTube.com, Basij Sh[o]ots to Death a Young Woman June 20th, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OjQxq5N--Kc (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  The endless 
television rebroadcasts and YouTube.com hits of the cell phone video showing the death of Neda 
Agha-Soltan during the 2009 post-election protests in Iran provides a good example of the merger of 
new and traditional media to show post-election violence.  Several media outlets delayed 
broadcasting the video because it could not be ―authenticated.‖  See Noam Cohen, How the Media 
Wrestle with the Web, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2009, at B4. 
34. See, e.g., Worth, supra note 9, at A1. 
35. See supra note 33. 
36. Kristine Höglund & Anton Piyarathne, Paying the Price for Patronage: Electoral Violence 
in Sri Lanka, 47 COMMONW. & COMP. POL. 287, 293 (2009); see also YouTube.com, Pre Election 
Violence in Sri Lanka, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrAaVo05F1o (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
37. Posting of Robert Mackey to N.Y. TIMES News Blog, 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/outside-sri-lanka-tamil-diaspora-not-ready-to-surrender/ 
(May 19, 2009, 06:36 EST). 
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forthcoming elections are free from violence. 
In 2008, the elections to determine the future of Zimbabwe’s President 
Robert Mugabe were marred by pre-election violence.
38
  A wave of killings, 
kidnappings, and arson displaced tens of thousands of people from their home 
areas, denying them the ability to vote in the national election and 
intimidating countless others from voting.
39
 
In Kenya, also in 2008, there was a massive wave of violence after 
incumbent president Mwai Kibaki was reelected in a questionable election.
40
  
Tribal and ethnic clashes resulted in more than 1,000 people being killed and 
more than 350,000 people being displaced.
41
  The uneasy peace which 
produced an end to the election violence may have permanently damaged 
Kenya’s reputation as one of the most stable and successful democracies in 
Africa.
42
 
In India, Kashmir separatists called for a boycott of the 2004 national 
parliamentary elections.  In the three weeks leading up to the election, militant 
groups allied with the Kashmir separatist movement staged a wave of attacks 
and bombings intended to intimidate voters and enforce the boycott against 
the election.
43
 
In Macedonia, violence erupted during the 2008 national parliamentary 
elections.
44
  The violence took place largely in ethnic Albanian areas and was 
perpetrated by supporters of the two ethnic Albanian political parties vying 
for the ethnic Albanian vote.
45
 
IV.  GOING FORWARD: MEDIA AND ELECTION VIOLENCE 
In recent years, conventional media have broadcast election violence.  
Lightweight cameras and satellite uplinks have made it possible for 
conventional media to broadcast some images of election violence that take 
place virtually anywhere in the world.  Even more pervasive are the images 
from personal media, such as cell phone cameras and lightweight digital video 
 
38. See Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe’s Crackdown Intensifies with Banning of Political Rallies, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at A6. 
39. Id.; see also Scott Baldauf, African Union Calls for Unity Government in Zimbabwe, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 3, 2008, at 90, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0703/p90s01-woaf.html. 
40. WAKI COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 351; Jeffrey Gettleman, Scarred by Strife After 
Election, Kenya Begins to Heal, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2008, at A10; YouTube.com, Post-Election 
Violence Continuing Across Kenya—28 Jan 08, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJ7Hv4xjhUM 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
41. Gettleman, supra note 40, at A10.  
42. Id. 
43. See David Rohde, India: Election Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A10. 
44. Dan Bilefsky, Violence Erupts in Macedonian Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008, at A8. 
45. Id. 
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cameras, that make their way to a broader audience, instantaneously and in 
unedited form.  As a result, now more than ever, the world has an opportunity 
to witness election violence.  But our greater ability to see such violence does 
little to explain the underlying causes or help our understanding of that 
violence.  Nor does it enable us to see if there are clear patterns of 
differentiated social activity or more universal motivations for election 
violence.  Certainly presentation of these images does nothing to address the 
path to resolution of the conflicts that underlie the violence. 
Despite plenty of anecdotal evidence and graphic images of election 
evidence, we still have very limited empirical and comparative evidence of 
the causes and trajectories of election violence. 
Our thinking about election violence leads us to several questions that can 
be turned into testable hypotheses for researchers to examine, including: 
 
(1)  Whether election violence is higher in conflict societies 
than in nonconflict societies. 
 
(2)  Whether election violence is greater in systems that have 
other forms of political violence. 
 
(3)  Whether violence is more likely to cause, protect, or 
reverse an election outcome. 
 
(4)  Whether violent manipulation of elections has different 
origins than nonviolent election manipulation. 
 
(5)  Whether election violence is greater when there are 
existing cleavages within society not rooted in ideology, but 
in ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, economic, or geographic 
differences. 
 
(6)  Whether election violence is greater at political transition 
points when the stakes are highest, such as the first 
democratic election, the end of dictatorship, upon 
independence, and so forth. 
 
(7)  Whether election violence is greater in systems in which 
the government, rather than an independent electoral 
commission, administers the election. 
 
(8)  With respect to the media, what are the dominant images 
of election violence? 
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(9)  What are the narratives used to portray election violence? 
 
(10)  Whether the ease of access to new technologies 
increases the reported incidence of election violence. 
 
Overall, our review of the issue suggests that this is a time of transition 
with respect to the media and its coverage of political violence.  With an 
increasing number of so-called democratic elections, it is time to consider in 
richer detail the role of violence and its presentation in those elections, and 
what role both new and old media play in the exacerbation or reduction of 
violence in times of electoral change. 
 
